The State Control Committee’s new powers have expanded the access and authority of supervisory bodies to use third-party organisations’ databases, whether state-owned or private , including access to individuals’ personal data without their consent. They have also granted supervisory bodies the right to block actions relating to the registration of civil society organisations. For CSOs, the changes raise practical concerns about privacy, confidentiality and freedom of association.
Law of 17 July 2026 “On Amending Laws on the Activities of the Bodies of the State Control Committee” (published 24 July 2026) substantially expands the powers of the State Control Committee and its financial investigations bodies.
For civil society, two changes stand out:
- Financial investigators gain unrestricted, warrantless access to personal and legally protected data held by virtually any organisation; and
- Separately, the State Control Committee gains the power to block the registration actions for any legal entity (initial registration, changing of the charters, mergers or transformations, as well as liquidation).
From 25 January 2027, the State Control Committee will be able to request and obtain personal, banking, and other protected information free of charge from state bodies, other organisations and individuals. It will also be able to obtain personal data from information systems operated by state bodies and other organisations without the consent of the individuals concerned, including through remote access, even where it is classified as commercial, professional, banking, notarial or otherwise legally protected information. Financial investigations bodies receive an even broader power to use digital platforms, information systems and databases of state and other organisations, and to obtain protected data. The law does not make prior judicial authorisation a general precondition for such access, although it refers to written or electronic requests, agreements with data holders and other legal requirements.
Unlimited access to personal data and other protected databases as a new threat to CSOs and the right to privacy
For CSOs, the practical implications are significant. An organisation may hold information about its members, donors, workers and volunteers, while banks, payment services and other organisations may hold the related financial or identifying information. The amended framework allows authorities to obtain information directly from these different sources rather than relying only on materials provided by the CSO itself. This can reduce an organisation’s ability to control the confidentiality of information concerning its beneficiaries and stakeholders and may make it easier to combine information held by different institutions.
Today, financial investigators may draw on state bodies' systems as a matter of course but can only reach other organisations' databases only when inspecting that specific organisation. The new law allows them to reach into any organisation's records at any time, banks, trading platforms, internet services and crypto exchanges included. For CSOs, this cuts both ways: they can no longer assure members, donors, staff or volunteers of confidentiality, and, when a CSO itself is under scrutiny, investigators can pull data about it from third parties without making official requests.
Violation of international privacy standards
The issue is not that all state access to personal data is prohibited: financial enforcement and crime prevention can pursue legitimate aims. The key question is whether the breadth of access is accompanied by sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interference, including clear limits on the purpose and scope of data access, necessity and proportionality, independent oversight and effective remedies. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Belarus is a party, protects individuals against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy.
The breadth of this access is particularly concerning in the context of the rapidly expanding use of artificial intelligence and automated data analysis. If information held by different Belarusian legal entities can be accessed and combined, authorities could potentially link banking and payment records with data on travel, ticket purchases, taxi and car-sharing use, online purchases, internet connections and postal services, taxation, foreign funding and other aspects of an individual’s activities. The ability to cross-reference such datasets can create detailed behavioural profiles and identify patterns and relationships that are not apparent when each dataset is considered separately. In a context where civil society organisations, their members, donors and other associated individuals already face heightened scrutiny, such capabilities could facilitate targeted surveillance, profiling and discriminatory or retaliatory measures, including transnational repression. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in resolution “The right to privacy in the digital age” warned that AI-driven profiling and large-scale data processing can undermine privacy, freedom of association and other rights, particularly where systems are opaque, difficult to challenge and not subject to effective independent oversight. So, international human rights standards require interference with privacy to be lawful, necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, and call for safeguards against unauthorised access, incompatible uses of personal information and abuse.
The same legislative package also expressly expands the role of the State Control Committee in countering extremism and terrorism, with financial investigations bodies getting authorisation to prevent, detect and suppress the financing and other material support of extremist and terrorist activities. The same law amends the 2002 Law on Counter-Terrorism to formally designate the SCC’s financial investigations bodies as counter-terrorism authorities, including in relation to the prevention, detection and suppression of terrorist financing.
Combined with their newly expanded access to financial records, databases and other information held by state and non-state actors, these provisions give the authorities broader tools to monitor financial flows and investigate organisations and individuals connected with civil society. While the stated purpose is countering terrorism and extremism, the breadth of these powers makes safeguards around the collection, use and sharing of financial and personal information particularly relevant for CSOs, donors, staff and other persons associated with them.
Registration or liquidation can be suspended in a frame of the control process, and access to bank accounts can be blocked
The law also changes the position of legal entities in relation to state registration and liquidation. From 25 January 2027, the State Control Committee and financial investigations bodies will be able to apply to courts for the invalidation of registration or registration changes, and for the liquidation or termination of a legal entity in cases provided by law. From 1 July 2027, they will additionally be able to impose a direct ban on registration actions concerning a legal entity (including all areas of registration records, not only state registration of the newly founded legal entities). The ban may be imposed where, among other grounds, the entity has unpaid administrative penalties; a violation has been identified involving the entity, its officers, founders or persons able to determine its actions; an administrative process is pending; or a scheduled or unscheduled inspection has not yet been completed.
This is particularly significant for CSOs because registration provides legal personality and enables organisations to operate through a recognised legal form. A registration ban triggered by an ongoing administrative process or an inspection that has not yet been completed can therefore become a practical barrier to changing an organisation’s legal status. The timing is also important: from 1 July 2027, another new law on state registration will introduce national-security screening for founders or members of certain previously more accessible non-commercial forms, including private institutions and associations. Taken together, these changes introduce additional state-control mechanisms into an already restrictive registration environment for parts of civil society.
This new Law of 17 July 2026 adds a further, parallel layer to a pattern CSO Meter flagged as early warning in the beginning of 2026, when tax authorities began freezing the accounts and e-wallets of organisations found "absent" at their registered legal address, often without prior notice and with no right of court appeal against the inspection act itself. The new law now gives the State Control Committee the power to suspend operations on bank accounts and e-wallets, to secure recovery of its own fines or where a legal entity fails to submit licences or documents, submits false information, or has concealed profit, or non-payment of tax. The State Control Committee separately gains the power to suspend a company's operations outright (not just its accounts) for breaches of pricing, trade or catering rules, and, when acting on presidential instructions, for breaches of any other legislation within its competence. Taken together with the tax authorities' existing freezes, Belarusian organisations (including CSOs) now face at least three distinct, overlapping state powers that can paralyse their finances with little advance warning, apparently no meaningful avenue for prior challenge.
What happens next?
The main package of amendments applies from 25 January 2027, while the direct registration-ban provisions take effect on 1 July 2027, in one package with new restrictive registration rules. The period before implementation will be important for monitoring how the new powers work in practice, including the rules and agreements governing access to personal data and the procedures for imposing and lifting registration bans. For civil society, key issues will be the clarity of the legal criteria, the availability of prompt and effective judicial review, and safeguards against excessive or arbitrary use of control powers. International standards emphasise that registration procedures should be simple, accessible, transparent and proportionate, while potentially intrusive state interference with associations should be subject to strong procedural safeguards.
The government has six months from publication to align subordinate legislation with the new law, so the practical rules governing data-sharing agreements and registration vetoes are still to be written. The sector should watch how those implementing rules define “protected information” and what, if any, notice or appeal rights accompany a registration block, since the law itself sets no independent check on either power.