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Roundup of developments in Georgia: August 2026

As tensions in the country continue to rise, so do concerns over the risk of violence, detentions and the powers of the newly established Hate Speech Monitoring Division.
Negative change for civil society
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Georgian parliament

#1 Administrative detention of journalist Vakho Sanaia 

On 22 July 2026, the Tbilisi City Court imposed 14 days' administrative detention on Formula TV journalist Vakho Sanaia over a Facebook post concerning the Speaker of Parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, and MP Vladimer Bozhadze. The detention was requested by the newly established Hate Speech Prevention Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as a repeated insult of political office holders. Earlier, on 10 July 2026, following the motion of the same Division, the court imposed a 1,980 EUR (GEL 6,000) administrative fine against Sanaia for aFacebook post3following public remarks by MP Vladimer Bozhadze concerning Levan Murusidze, a member of the High Council of Justice. The Hate Speech Prevention Division was created by amendments to the Statute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Human Rights Protection Department and began operating on 1 June 2026. The Division, comprising approximately ten employees, is mandated to monitor social media and initiate proceedings under existing provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences, primarily Article 17316 (insulting a state political officeholder or public official) and Article 166 (petty hooliganism, including public swearing or insulting conduct). However, neither the legislation nor the Ministry has explained how cases are selected from the millions of social media accounts operating in Georgia. This broad discretion creates a risk of selective enforcement, raising concerns about the impartial and even-handed application of the law, particularly where enforcement appears to focus on criticism of public officials. 

The Vakho Sanaia case also arises in a broader context in which representatives or supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party have repeatedly used derogatory and stigmatising rhetoric against journalists, civil society organisations, political opponents, women activists and LGBTQ+ persons - while reports of intimidation and politically motivated violence have frequently failed to elicit  comparable legal responses. Publicly documented examples include threatening statements by ruling party officials, campaigns targeting activists, and violent confrontations committed by ruling party MPs against their political opponents, motivated by political bias.

The Division's creation underscores the importance the authorities themselves attach to addressing abusive and intolerant expression. Against that background, the continued absence of any comparable enforcement against the party members is particularly concerning, especially given that international standards place a heightened responsibility on public officials and political leaders to refrain from rhetoric that fuels hostility or intolerance because of their influence over public discourse. 

The detention of journalist Vakho Sanaia illustrates the broader risk that powers introduced in the name of combating hate speech may be used beyond their legitimate purpose. 

The international human rights standards distinguish hate speech from offensive, insulting or satirical political expressions and call for carefully calibrated responses. The application of administrative powers to satirical commentary therefore raises serious concerns that such measures may be used to suppress expression that is protected under several international human rights norms and enjoys a particularly high level of protection.

#2 MMA fighter's vow to 'protect Georgian values' sparks concerns over intimidation and impunity

On 27 July 2026, MMA fighter Giorgi Kartvelishvili made an announcement regarding the co-creation of a so-called "people's movement" aimed at "fighting" against individuals and groups its founders accuse of insulting Georgian identity, traditions, religion, and national values.

Kartvelishvili's announcement must be viewed together with the 23 July attack on comedian Onise Okriashvili and the public campaign that followed in defense of the person charged in that case. Kartvelishvili publicly described the assault as a reaction to "provocation," and came to the defense of the accused, Niko Khurtsilava. He called on Okriashvili and others to ask prosecutors not to pursue Khurtsilava's detention.

Given this context of supporting an assault on a comedian, the stated goals and rhetoric behind the new movement raise significant concern that it may function not as a legitimate civic organisation, but as a tool for intimidating, retaliating against, and informally punishing people whose views, artistic work, or political stances its members find objectionable.

Kartvelishvili said the movement would launch “for the protection of Georgian values, principles and traditions, and is beginning a struggle against … foreign-funded external interests.” He added that while they intend to operate within legal bounds, they would not be deterred by the prospect of imprisonment if they felt they had no other option.

These remarks go well beyond advocating for lawful public expression. The idea that members are already prepared to face imprisonment for their actions understandably raises fears that the movement may be contemplating violence, threats, coercion, coordinated harassment, or other illegal forms of retaliation. The claim that the group intends to stay within the law is considerably weakened by the accompanying suggestion that certain unnamed circumstances could justify breaking it.

The threatening nature of this language is heightened by the fact that Kartvelishvili is a trained MMA fighter. Given that a professional fighter is calling for a collective "struggle," is unwilling to exclude actions that could lead to imprisonment and is doing so right after publicly justifying an assault, the potential for intimidation must be taken seriously.

The announcement is especially concerning given the mentioned political backing of a man, Niko Khurtsilava, who physically assaulted comedian Onise Okriashvili in public. Georgian Dream MP and regional secretary Dimitri Samkharadze publicly called Khurtsilava a patriot and a "true Georgian,"1 described his conduct as a response to overstepped limits and offered to use his position as an MP to guarantee his release. Georgian Dream's youth wing, party activists, and figures aligned with the government reportedly showed up at the court hearing and cheered for Khurtsilava when he was released on bail. The fact that senior party figures and party-affiliated groups openly endorsed the earlier violence gives rise to a legitimate worry that the new movement may anticipate political leniency, cover, or immunity from consequences. Kartvelishvili himself is seen close to the Georgian Dream party establishment with his wife being employed by the pro-governmental Rustavi TV. 

While Kartvelishvili's statement on its own does not confirm that the elements of any criminal offence have been met, several factors together warrant a swift, impartial, and preventive review of the movement: the announced formation of an organised group, its designation of ideological opponents as targets, its stated intent to deliver "immediate" or "appropriate" responses, and its explicit acknowledgment that members are willing to engage in conduct that could lead to imprisonment. Such a review should look into the movement's organisational structure, membership, recruitment practices, methods, training, resources, funding, connections to political figures, and any indications of planned violence, coercion, intimidation, or other criminal activity.

The statement further raises concerns in line with the newly established Hate Speech Monitoring Division. The Division, operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Human Rights Protection Department, became operational on 1 June 2026. It tracks social media activity and brings administrative cases, relying mainly on Article 173¹⁶ of the Code of Administrative Offences (insulting a state political officeholder or public official) and Article 166 (petty hooliganism, including public swearing or insulting conduct). By 1 August 2026, it had sent over 300 cases to court, with about 130 already being completed.

The Hate Speech Prevention Division's operations also raise serious questions about their consistency with international standards on freedom of expression and hate speech. Instead of tackling advocacy of hatred that amounts to incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence, the Division relies on administrative offences that have existed for years and exercises wide, untransparent discretion in choosing which cases to pursue. 

The result appears to be selective enforcement aimed mainly at critics of public officials, while similar or even more serious abusive conduct by Georgian Dream representatives has not led to administrative liability, even though the relevant legal provisions have been in place for years.

At the same time, enforcing religion, morality, tradition, or national identity is not a role that private individuals or informal groups are entitled to take on. Deciding what qualifies as "Georgian," moral, or religious, drawing ideological "red lines," or punishing those seen as having crossed them are functions that fall outside the rule of law and belong exclusively to the state's responsibility for maintaining public order. Georgia's Constitution safeguards freedom of opinion, expression, and peaceful assembly — including expression that some may find controversial, satirical, or offensive. The state therefore bears a positive obligation not merely to avoid restricting lawful expression, but also to shield individuals from intimidation, threats, and violence by private actors attempting to silence them for ideological reasons.

#3 Hate Speech Monitoring Division - Administrative Arrests

Between 26 July and 27 July 2026, Georgian police detained at least twelve people in Tbilisi in connection with protest banners referencing Bidzina Ivanishvili, honorary chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream party. The detentions took place on the 606th and 607th consecutive days of an ongoing pro-EU protest movement that has continued since November 2024, and they culminated in one individual, Tornike Toshkhua, being detained twice within a single week for closely related conduct — the second time more severely than the first.

On 26 July, Toshkhua displayed a banner outside the Tbilisi City Council building on Liberty Square posing a crude yes/no question about Ivanishvili. He was the first detained. His arrest drew other activists to the scene, who held up banners with identical wording in a show of solidarity; police then detained nine more of them, in some cases using force to remove protesters from the group. All ten were charged under Articles 166 and 173 of Georgia's Administrative Offenses Code — covering "petty hooliganism" (Administrative Offences Code Article 166) and "disobeying a lawful order of police" (Administrative Offences Code Article 173) — a charge pairing that in practice has been applied broadly to non-violent expressive conduct rather than conduct involving public disorder or resistance to arrest in the ordinary sense.

The following day, activists gathered at City Hall to protest the arrests. Nodar Tsitsriashvili displayed a banner echoing Toshkhua's original wording and was detained on the same charge. He told journalists his intent was to resist intimidation, not to give offense, stating that "insulting Bidzina is not my goal — Bidzina insults himself." That evening, at the long-running pro-EU demonstration on Rustaveli Avenue, a large share of the banners on display responded directly to Toshkhua's original question, embedding the case within the broader protest movement's messaging rather than treating it as an isolated event.

Tbilisi City Court ruled on the ten July 26 cases between the evening of 28 July and the early hours of 29 July, with a further ruling issued later that day. Five defendants were fined, ranging from GEL 3,000 to GEL 6,000 (roughly 990-1,980 EUR  ); five others received administrative detention terms of between four and ten days. Toshkhua himself received the financial penalty in this round — a 90 EUR (GEL 3,000 fine). One case, that of Tornike Tikaradze, was postponed. Tsitsriashvili, detained separately on 27 July, was sentenced to four days' detention.

Toshkhua's case did not end there. On 31 July, he returned to the same location with a modified version of his banner — using only the initial letter of the "offensive" term rather than spelling it out in full. He was detained again on the same charge, and on Sunday, 2 August 2026, was sentenced to five days of administrative detention for petty hooliganism. Notably, based on the recent protest-related amendments to the Administrative Offences Code, this second, more indirect act drew a harsh penalty (detention) that points to sentencing practice tracking the individual's history and repeated conduct rather than the severity of the specific banner.

Toshkhua's case carries additional weight because of his recent history in, as local groups describe, politically motivated detention. He had been released only three weeks earlier, on 1 July 2026, after spending nearly ten months in pre-trial detention and imprisonment following a conviction, alongside co-defendant Mindia Shervashidze, on an alleged "group violence" charge. That case stemmed from a 2025 altercation on Rustaveli Avenue involving a Georgian Dream-affiliated football player. Both defendants denied the charge and maintained that the complainant, who was armed with the knife, had provoked the confrontation.2 An appellate court reduced their sentences — a rare instance of a lower-court ruling being modified in a protest-related case which resultedg in early release. Toshkhua's re-arrest over the Ivanishvili banners followed within roughly four weeks of that release, meaning he had spent only a brief period outside detention before again facing prosecution for protest-related conduct. 

The banners in question, however crude in language, constitute political expression directed at a public figure exercising significant informal political influence in Georgia. Besides,Toshkhua stated that when he was taken away from the area surrounding the City Council building, no one informed him that he was being arrested. Instead, he was left with the impression that he was simply being removed from the area. This enforcement pattern must also be read against Georgia's recent domestic legal changes: a 2025 law criminalising insults directed at state and political officials, and the establishment in June 2026 of a dedicated Interior Ministry unit tasked with monitoring and penalizing "hate speech." Domestic and international civil society observers have characterised this unit's actual function as expanding state capacity to suppress anti-government expression under the language of hate-speech enforcement, rather than addressing conduct that would meet an ordinary definition of hate speech (i.e., speech targeting protected characteristics or inciting violence against groups). 

The recent arrests are reinforcing concerns that enforcement in this case reflects political motivation rather than content-neutral application of public order law. 

Persons detained:
NameDate detainedCharge(s) under Administrative Offences CodeOutcome
Tornike Toshkhua26 JulyArt. 166, 173Fined GEL 3,000 (~990 EUR)
Tornike Toshkhua (2nd detention)31 JulyArt. 1665 days' detention (ruling 2 Aug)
Vasil Beridze26 JulyArt. 166, 173Fined GEL 5,000 (~1,650 EUR)
Sandro Sekhniashvili26 JulyArt. 166, 173Fined GEL 5,000 (~1,560 EUR )
Marine Nanava26 JulyArt. 166, 173Fined GEL 5,000 (~1,560 EUR )
Mariam Mekantsishvili26 JulyArt. 166, 173Fined GEL 6,000 (~1,980 EUR)
Ia Melitauri26 JulyArt. 166, 1735 days' detention
Nato Bolkvadze26 JulyArt. 166, 1735 days' detention
Shako Baghdoshvili26 JulyArt. 166, 17310 days' detention
Lasha Dgebuadze26 JulyArt. 166, 17310 days' detention
Tornike Tikaradze26 JulyArt. 166, 173Ruling postponed
Nodar Tsitsriashvili27 JulyArt. 1664 days' detention

 

#4  Fatal shooting in Tbilisi raises questions over police accountability and use of health data as surveillance and control 

On 22 July 2026, in Tbilisi, an armed man opened fire in a residential area, injuring four people, including three minors and female passer-by, before retreating into the building which was his mother’s hotel. One of the injured minors, a 17-year-old Nikoloz Ghunashvili, died shortly after being admitted to the hospital. As reported, the man opened fire to responding officers before being taken into custody. Injured, he was taken to the hospital. Later, he was identified as 42-years old Nikoloz Kapanadze. 

An eyewitness account given to RFE/RL describes a shooting in Tbilisi in which a group of young men, laughing as they walked along Shanidze Street, were confronted without provocation by a man shouting at them from a hotel window; when they responded calmly and began heading back to their car, an older man's brief intervention delayed their departure. The accused rushed out armed and opened fire on their vehicle as they tried to drive off. Neighbours and media reports describe the accused as having a history of erratic, aggressive behavior, a prior conviction, and a restraining order tied to his mother, who has publicly claimed he has mental health issues and that police knew about it. Prosecutors say he was legally permitted to own firearms but not to carry them in public, and confirm that his weapons were confiscated after an earlier domestic violence complaint from his mother but returned about a month later once the alleged abuse went uncorroborated. They also note that the mental health claims are unsupported by medical evidence, raising the possibility his mother's statements were meant to shield him from liability. Police say they are now investigating the case and that a mental health evaluation of the accused is planned.

The incident raises serious concerns about how effectively the authorities are addressing mental health, public safety, and crime prevention. It marks the second known fatal case within a year in which relatives or neighbours reported that the alleged perpetrator had experienced mental health issues, pointing to possible shortcomings in risk assessment, access to adequate care, and coordination between agencies. 

Rather than linking violence to mental illness as such, these cases show failure of authorities in providing accessible, rights-based mental health care, and investment in prevention. These developments are concerning given the government's recent creation of a centralised mental health registry, officially presented as a tool for vetting applicants for firearm and driving licences. Human rights groups, mental health professionals, and civil society organisations have cautioned that the registry could compromise medical confidentiality, broaden law enforcement's access to sensitive health information, deepen stigma and discrimination, and discourage people from seeking mental health treatment. 

Against this backdrop, the recurrence of fatal incidents even as the state's expands the collection of sensitive mental health data raises concerns since the current policy is oriented more towards surveillance and suppression of dissent, rather than towards the delivery of effective, rights-based mental health services and violence prevention.

 

 

  • 1

    Dimitri Samkharadze has a long-standing history of assault, including physical assault, against civil society representatives and opposition members in Georgia. One such incident occurred on 31 May 2024. According to reports and based on his own Facebook post, Georgian Dream party member Dimitri Samkharadze admitted that he and members of his group were behind humiliating and threatening posters and graffiti targeting independent civil society representatives. He posted a Facebook status stating: “The low-quality bullying initiated by neo-fascists and stateless agents was answered yesterday! We won't tolerate you in the slightest and forgive you. Bully each other! What you intend against us, we will return to you a thousand times worse, painful, and of higher quality! You won't want to show up and run into each other. You won't even want to see each other. We'll treat you like that! You are having a lot of fun; We know your identity one by one; your owners can't help you if you do something bad to any member of the Georgian Dream team! So that I don't miss the point, stop looking back; we are not sneaking up on anyone; look ahead; don't step on anything!" Attached to the post was a video showing his associates spray-painting insulting messages outside the offices of organisations targeted by Georgian Dream, as well as near activists' homes.

  • 2

    Toshkhua was arrested on 16 August 2025, over an incident that took place on 1 August 2025 on Tbilisi’s Rustaveli Avenue in front of the parliament building, where anti-government demonstrators have been gathering as part of continuous protests since November 2024. He and Mindia Shervashidze were accused of “group violence” against the late football player and Georgian Dream supporter Beka Gotsiridze, with authorities claiming they attacked him during the rally. Protesters and bystanders, however, alleged that Gotsiridze provoked the altercation and had attempted to pull out a knife, which he dropped as he fell. Gotsiridze died suddenly in February at the age of 37.

05-08-2026
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
Freedom of Expression
State Duty to Protect
Digital Rights
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