Armenia

Key priorities to improve the civil society environment:

1. The Ministry of Finance provides a definition of “grant” in accordance with the best international practices and following consultation with CSOs and does not treat grant projects or other non-profit activities as economic activities;  
2. The government (particularly the Ministry of Finance) and the National Assembly create a more favourable tax environment to improve the possibilities for CSOs to seek funding and in-kind support from diverse sources, including individual and business donations and direct entrepreneurship activities;  
3. The National Assembly establishes mechanisms for mandatory public consultations on draft legislation produced by members of the National Assembly and for CSO engagement in both the early stages of legal drafts and during the final revisions of the drafts received by the government (including through engagement at the level of Standing Committees);
4. State bodies utilise and expand the pre-existing and new institutional mechanisms of participation to ensure meaningful participation, including through: (a) engaging CSOs in the early stages of policy development; (b) addressing the drawbacks of the e-draft platform and providing statistics on participation activities and the incorporation of comments on this platform; (c) providing sufficient time for consultations and organising more frequent face-to-face consultations, including in the regions; and (d) considering and incorporating well-founded and evidence-based suggestions to the maximum possible extent;
5. The government and public officials uphold freedom of expression standards, promote a culture of open and respectful public dialogue, and ensure responsible communication toward the media, refraining from intolerance towards diverse or critical opinions as well as from statements that may incite hostility or undermine public trust in journalists and media;
6. The government introduces stronger safeguards against unlawful surveillance and breaches of privacy, ensuring independent oversight and transparent investigations of violations; and
7. The state provides adequate protection for CSOs, including through: (a) adopting anti-discrimination laws and establishing an anti-discrimination body; (b) taking legislative and practical measures against SLAPPs in line with the Council of Europe’s recommendations adopted in April 2024; (c) issuing public statements in support of CSOs that are targeted by third parties; and (d) ensuring proper investigation of attacks against CSOs and activists within a reasonable timeframe. 

Ongoing action - Advancing public participation:

1. Transparency International Anticorruption Center advocates to increase legal avenues for public participation in the early stages of policymaking. This can significantly improve participation, and thus also the quality of policymaking in Armenia, and serve as inspiration for actions in other countries. Advocacy towards this reform received financial support from the CSO Meter Action Pooled Fund.
2. Supporting the financial sustainability of organisations as a key pillar for lasting civic action. In Armenia, NGO Center pursues expanding the incentives for charity, through tax benefits and public benefit status. Supporting philanthropy and domestic giving will be a key step to help Armenian CSOs become less dependent on funding from abroad.

Past achievements:  

CSO Meter monitoring and recommendations have already delivered the following results:

• Expanding CSOs’ role in public interest litigation (2025): CSO Meter Hub member Law Development & Protection Foundation (LDPF) has advocated as part of the project to expand the Actio Popularis principle to allow CSOs to represent public interest in court.  
• Progressive law on volunteering (2023): CSOs, including CSO Meter core partner, Transparency International Anticorruption Center (TIAC) successfully blocked restrictive provisions in different draft versions of the law. The law adopted integrates CSO Meter recommendations to protect and encourage volunteerism. This means that CSOs can harness the power of volunteer work to achieve their missions and volunteers can also enjoy essential protections of their rights.  
• Strengthening public participation for better policies (2023-2024): The government incorporated CSO Meter Recommendations on decision-making participation into the 2023 amendments to the Public Administration Reform strategy, adding a new fifth pillar on participatory governance. This pillar outlines steps to strengthen public participation, including creating a monitoring mechanism and advancing online and offline participatory tools. Based on the amended PAR strategy and Open Government Partnership Action Plan 2022-2024, a dedicated department at the Office of the Prime Minister was created, to institutionalise open government principles and support civil society development. Drawing on comparative good practices on the functions and responsibilities of similar departments in other countries identified by TIAC and ECNL, the department aims to ensure participation of CSOs in decision making. This will ultimately unlock access to expertise and localised knowledge, leading to more informed policies and better solutions.  
• Transparent rules for state funding for CSOs introduced (2019-2021): The majority of TIAC suggestions were integrated into the procedure of allocating state grants and subsidies to legal entities. These rules ensure transparency and accountability, particularly in the selection process and regarding conflict of interest and the tasks of the grant selection committee. TIAC, consulting with other CSOs, provided expertise to the Ministry of Finance, helping set up standardised grant documentation (templates, announcements) and effective use of the new electronic platform.  These changes support transparent access to public funding for civil society.
• Proportionate reporting rules for CSOs ensured (2018-2020): TIAC, alongside other CSOs and with ECNL’s support, successfully advocated for reporting rules for CSOs in Armenia that align with international standards. Initial legislative proposals of the government required public organisations and foundations to disclose sensitive details like donor names, board members, staff, and volunteers. Thanks to the efforts of CSOs, the final law amendments ensure annual reporting that promotes transparency without compromising privacy or creating unnecessary burdens. This reform strengthens CSO accountability while safeguarding the space for civil society to operate freely and effectively. 

Country context and important trends relevant to the civil society environment:

The political environment in Armenia in 2025 was shaped by continued threats to the country by Azerbaijan’s political leadership,1 with negotiations around a peace agreement taking place in parallel. Furthermore, the political landscape was impacted by rising tensions ahead of the 2026 elections, along with the lingering effects of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, which were all happening in the broader context of geopolitical shifts, including shifting foreign policy priorities of the European Union (the EU) and United States of America (the U.S), heightened instability in the Middle East, democracy backsliding in neighbouring Georgia, and the continued war in Ukraine. 

In 2025, Armenia took several steps to develop its foreign policy agenda towards strengthening its relations with the EU and the U.S.. In early 2025, following a citizen legislative initiative, the National Assembly adopted the Law on Initiating the Process of Armenia’s Accession to the European Union, reflecting the government’s political will as well as being a strategic move towards integrating Armenia with the wider EU.2 In parallel, based on EU visa liberalisation negotiations, which commenced in September 2024, and following significant progress made by the Armenian government, the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan was handed over by the EU to the Armenian government in early November 2025. This Action Plan highlighted reforms regarding document security, border and migration management, public order and security, including data protection, and external relations and fundamental rights.3 For civil society organisations (CSOs), this move created new opportunities to engage in EU-driven reform processes and policy dialogues, while at the same time placed additional pressure on the government to align policies and legislation with the more demanding European standards. Further, on 2 December 2025, the EU and Armenia adopted a new Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership, building on the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (the CEPA), and deepening the political, economic and sectoral cooperation between the two parties.4 Along with the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in January 2025, which strengthened grounds for cooperation with the U.S. in areas such as democracy, human rights and cybersecurity,5 these steps underscored Armenia’s efforts to diversify its geopolitical affiliations and security partnerships.

On 8 August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a US-mediated Joint Declaration, initialling the peace agreement text. The Declaration included commitments to close the OSCE Minsk Process and to open transport and communication routes on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction of the two countries, including the provision of unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan through Armenia under the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (the TRIPP project). While the pre-signed peace agreement generated cautious optimism for the normalisation of relations between the two nations and enhanced border security, the clause on withdrawing all interstate claims drew serious criticism by a group of human rights organisations. In early 2025, CSOs warned that abandoning cases before international courts would undermine citizens’ rights, breach Armenia’s international obligations and allow Azerbaijan to evade accountability. CSOs also emphasised that any political settlement of the conflict must be accompanied by mechanisms to ensure justice for any victims.

In May-June 2025, tensions escalated between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC). In recent years, some of the leading figures of the AAC have openly aligned themselves with opposing political forces, and repeatedly demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister. In his statements and online social media posts, the Prime Minister accused the ACC’s church leaders of possessing a lack of integrity and made allegations of corruption towards them. The confrontation between the government and the AAC sparked public outrage, and many citizens, including representatives of some CSOs, criticised the Prime Minister for using obscene language and interfering with the autonomy and internal affairs of the AAC. This escalation was accompanied by the revelation of plans of an alleged coup by several religious and political figures, who were arrested by the National Security Service (the NSS) in June 2025. At the same time, the National Assembly stripped the immunity entitlements of three opposition members of parliament (MPs), paving the way for prosecutions which were claimed by their allies as politically motivated.

Public trust towards the government continues to decline. A poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in June-July 2025 found that 49% of respondents believe that Armenia was headed in the “wrong direction”, compared to 36% who think it is moving in the right direction, while 61% mentioned that they do not trust any political figure. This distrust towards state institutions is closely linked with the high level of polarisation and disinformation that persists in Armenian society, along with the high level of hateful rhetoric. For CSOs, this social polarisation and the related political tensions demand careful balancing, as they face a new wave of public pressure and stigmatisation both for voicing criticism and for engaging in collaboration initiatives with government actors. 

External funding trends have further deepened the vulnerabilities of Armenian civil society. Cuts in foreign aid, particularly from the U.S., have heavily affected many CSOs. This has forced programme closures and left many organisations having to survive by sharply reducing the scope of their operations, meaning that they are now often unable to cover basic costs such as the rent of office spaces. This funding crisis has underscored the sector’s dependence on external support and has highlighted the remaining gaps in financial sustainability. Media organisations were hit especially hard in the first few months of 2025, with shrinking resources undermining the scope of independent journalism, thereby increasing the exposure of media organisations to political pressures and external influences. Despite repeated appeals by CSOs and media organisations for government support, no substantive response was provided by the government. The updated EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Armenia underlined the sector’s financial sustainability challenges alongside broader political and regional developments. The EU Roadmap also identified key enabling environment constraints and capacity gaps and offered strategic guidance to strengthen the role of CSOs in democratic governance, policy dialogue, and sustainable development. 

Video story

Why was collaboration through the CSO Meter essential to create more transparent state funding procedures? Find out more from Anush Hakobyan, Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center (Armenia):