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Overall situation and state of civil society
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In 2023, the context for the functioning of civil society in Belarus was predetermined by the authorities’ policy aimed at ensuring the preservation of a stable authoritarian regime. This political course does not tolerate opposition or any form of organised dissent and ignores international standards in the field of freedom of association.
First and foremost, repressions and restrictions on civil society can be observed both in the introduction of new legal regulations and the implementation or expansion of new practices. Repression aims to instil a climate of fear in most areas of public life, and specifically through the widespread administration of restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, including harsh criminal sanctions. These restrictions are coupled with long prison sentences for CSO leaders and activists, journalists and contributors to independent media (and sometimes even ordinary readers and subscribers), opposition leaders, human rights defenders, trade union and political activists, as well as participants in the 2020-2022 protests.
Despite the release of certain political prisoners, their number remains at the level of not less than one and a half thousand due to new sentences, including the outrageous conviction of Nobel laureate and leader of the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’ Ales Bialiatski, who was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on 3 March 2023. Searches and raids with pogroms on activists’ apartments are widely practiced and have especially intensified following the start of the election campaign at the end of 2023.
Digital technologies are not used to expand human capabilities, but are aimed at creating new surveillance mechanisms, identifying internet activity, deanonymizing users and interfering with their privacy.
Along with individual repression, there has also been a systemic liquidation of entire clusters of independent organisations. A campaign of liquidating public associations, foundations and institutions has been ongoing since 2021. All independent trade unions were closed down in 2022 and all opposition political parties lost their registration as a result of re-registration in 2023. Re-registration of religious organisations is planned for 2024-2025.
The destruction of opposition parties in 2023 (besides the four loyalist ones) has marked a new ideological trend whereby any public expression of a different view on the development of Belarus becomes risky and may lead to repression.
Secondly, the construction of a new state-controlled civil society system is evident, including legislative consolidation of non-equal treatment for CSOs, whereby government-organised/operated non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) or other CSOs that demonstrate loyalty to the current authorities enjoy the greatest advantages at both the legislative and practical levels. In this area, trends have been observed in 2023 which were laid down in 2022, when a reference to ‘civil society’ was added to the Constitution of Belarus as a result of a referendum.
However, the understanding of the notion of civil society developed in the Law on the Essentials of Civil Society and the Law on the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly is fundamentally different from the one generally accepted in the world. The definition consolidates civil society as controlled by the state, built into the machinery of government and as a conglomerate of hierarchically-structured associations that are loyal and integral to the current regime. The existence of independent CSOs is possible; they are not prohibited as such. But they are subject to various forms of control, restrictions and government interference, and they are also required to demonstrate loyalty to the Government’s political course and avoid any manifestation of opposition sentiments or disagreement with the authorities.
In contrast to previous repressive attacks on civil society, the authorities are now paying significantly more attention to creating favourable conditions for the activities of controlled organisations. This includes intensifying the activities of GONGOs and forcing them to expand their activities into the areas that are vacant following the liquidation of independent CSOs. This trend can also be observed in the increase of financial support, the requirement for such organisations to expand their memberships and cover various social strata, the intensification of GONGOs’ activities in the media and in the system of ideological propaganda. It is difficult to assess the degree of GONGOs’ overall influence, but there is no doubt that this influence is growing.
Therefore, there are now three types of CSOs operating inside Belarus:
1) small and secretive clandestine groups, often connected with foreign opposition and with an evident political agenda;
2) a small number of GONGOs each having hundreds of thousands of members, as well as organisations more or less connected with the Government; and
3) small and latent CSOs that maintain varying degrees of independence, existing in a worsening legal regime and at risk of falling under repression and sanctions.
Grassroots initiatives in the process of organisational development feed into all three of these clusters. However, most of the new initiatives in today's civil society system abandon their growth strategy, remaining as informal groups and opting for solely grassroots activities which are often short-term.
In addition to this stratification within Belarus itself, there is also the formation of a community and infrastructure of decision-making centres comprising the emigrant and diaspora part of Belarusian civil society outside Belarus. A specific phenomenon for the current state of civil society is its division into emigrant and internal parts. Following the campaign of repression in 2021-2023, many CSO leaders and activists have left the territory of Belarus, continuing their activities on behalf of their CSOs or establishing new organisations in the countries that they relocate to (primarily Lithuania and Poland, somewhat less to Georgia and other countries).
Some emigrant/relocated CSOs experience difficulties in establishing non-profit legal entities and accessing banking services. In general, due to the Belarussian authorities’ support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the corresponding sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus, Belarusian CSOs located abroad can be seen as suspicious clients for banks, including within the framework of AML/CTF regulations.
Despite the fact that most emigrant CSOs are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Belarusian authorities, some legislative actions of the Belarusian Government are directed against the civil society diaspora in order to make its operation more difficult.
Independent CSOs inside Belarus continue to exist, albeit often by operating secretly, semi-legally, and with minimal funding. The fact that CSOs continue to operate in Belarus is still used as a basis for the ruling regime’s objection to it being described as totalitarian. However, it cannot be denied that some elements of a totalitarian system are visible in the model that is being built in Belarus in both law and practice (including growing surveillance of private life, Belarus’ growing isolation on the world stage, loyalty checks, and the establishment of a ruling party in 2023).
The general level of repression in the country, including widespread and often non-selective abuse of legislation on so-called ‘extremism’, has had a paralysing effect on civil society. Even the remaining legal CSOs act extremely cautiously, often latently and without coverage of their actions in the public spotlight, fearing the risks of going beyond their statutory activities and especially avoiding any visible connections with the democratic centres and media that are located abroad.
After the events of 2021-2022, it has become practically impossible to carry out certain activities inside Belarus. For example, public human rights activities and the establishment of trade unions independent from the state and opposition political parties. Other activities remain possible, and some, such as consumer rights protection, have de facto remained almost unchanged, despite the liquidation of a number of related organisations. In general, the opportunities for civil society activity vary depending on the area in which the organisation operates. However, activities such as collective public action, coalition activities and cross-sectoral interaction, public advocacy, and watchdog work almost cease to occur.
CSOs that continue to work in Belarus mostly deal with social issues and operate in line with state policies. Such issues include the provision of assistance to vulnerable groups, charitable activities, ecology, local development, urban planning, etc. Domestic groups have had great difficulty in attracting financial support from donors, both as a result of government obstacles and sanctions, and because it is easier for donors to support CSOs that have relocated their activities abroad. There is a trend whereby socially significant and social projects choose to perform their activities as commercial legal entities, since these entities are less exposed to the repressive attention of law enforcement agencies.
The destruction of the information and communication sphere is also significant for the civil society environment in Belarus. Almost all independent media have now been ousted abroad and included on the lists of extremist materials and/or extremist formations. As a result, references to CSOs by former popular independent media has become dangerous for them, and even the use of such media, when detected by the authorities, can become grounds for repression.
Although the war in Ukraine is an important social and political problem in the collective consciousness and is the reason for a new wave of repression, it is not on the current agenda of civil society inside Belarus (unlike for CSOs operating from abroad).
By the end of 2023, the state of civil society in Belarus has stabilised within the new status quo. In general, a series of crises and turmoil from 2020-2022 - the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2020 presidential elections and the protests and waves of repression that followed it (since 2021, especially focused against CSOs), and Belarus’ isolation from the West, especially after the start of the active phase of the war in Ukraine - has already led to the homeostasis of a new dynamic equilibrium. This new state is expected to be stable in the medium term unless it is disrupted by factors that are external to this system.
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In what ways has CSO Meter proven to be useful when CSOs face extreme restrictions in Belarus? Find out more from our video below: