Country context and important trends relevant to the civil society environment:
T In 2025, the Belarusian government's policy towards civil society remained fundamentally unchanged. Existing legislative and practical restrictions on the creation and operation of CSOs continued, alongside repressive measures against activists and organisations both inside the country and abroad. While some technical improvements in the legal environment occurred, these were largely incidental or intended to benefit state-controlled organisations and CSOs loyal to the ruling regime rather than independent civil society.
The presidential election held on 26 January 2025 did not represent a genuinely competitive political process and instead served primarily as a mechanism of political self-legitimation for seventh consecutive term. Neither independent civil society, whether inside Belarus or in exile, nor pro-government organisations regarded the election as a meaningful political event. Although loyal CSOs formally participated in nominating election commissions and observers, this involvement was largely symbolic and reflected informal obligations associated with receiving state support rather than genuine civic engagement. Nevertheless, the authorities treated the election as a potential security risk and intensified repressive activities against recipients of foreign assistance, former election participants, and online communication.
The broader international environment continued to shape the operating context for Belarusian civil society. Russia's war against Ukraine remained the principal factor influencing Belarus' international isolation, sanctions policy, and relations with European institutions. This isolation affected many spheres of international cooperation, including culture, education, sports, charity and humanitarian activities, while also facilitating greater influence of pro-Russian narratives within parts of Belarusian society.
Dialogue initiated by the new U.S. administration in 2025 contributed to the early release of additional dozens of political prisoners, including prominent civil society leaders such as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski. However, these releases resulted from transactional diplomacy rather than institutional human rights mechanisms. Individuals were pardoned and immediately expelled from Belarus as part of political negotiations involving limited sanctions relief rather than legal accountability or systemic reforms.
The overall number of political prisoners declined only moderately during 2025. New arrests continued throughout the year, particularly under legislation on extremism, including criminal prosecution for participation in so-called extremist formations, facilitating extremist activity, or disseminating "extremist materials" through social media. Although the total number of convictions and prison sentences decreased compared with previous years, repression remained widespread and continued to have a strong deterrent effect on civic participation.
The prolonged period of repression since 2020 has significantly reduced the availability of reliable information about civil society. Most monitoring organisations now operate from abroad, while experts inside Belarus are often unwilling to cooperate with international monitoring initiatives because of security risks and concerns regarding confidentiality. As a result, many traditional indicators used to assess civic space have become substantially more difficult to measure.
Methodological challenges are particularly acute regarding practical aspects of civil society activity. Compared to the first assessment conducted in 2019, only a small proportion of empirical information remains accessible. Monitoring increasingly relies on official government statistics, state publications and media reports, all of which provide only a partial and often biased picture. Legislative developments remain easier to analyse as legal acts are publicly available.
The large-scale campaign of forced liquidation of undesirable organisations that characterised the period from 2021 to 2024 has largely come to an end in 2025. However, rather than representing a nationwide campaign aimed at restructuring the entire sector, forced liquidation is now applied selectively against particular organisations considered undesirable by the authorities. Approximately 36 organisations were forcibly dissolved during 2025, compared with several hundred annually during the peak years of the campaign. Together with voluntary closures, around one hundred organisations initiated termination procedures during the year. As a result, the total number of formally registered CSOs continues to decline gradually. Overall, approximately 2,000 independent CSOs of various legal forms remain active in Belarus, although this figure increasingly coexists with some informal civic initiatives and unregistered forms of collective action that have emerged in response to the restrictive legal environment (but are at risk of beingpersecuted under criminal article 1931 for the activities of unregistered organisations).
Restrictions on civil society continue to extend well beyond registration. The principal obstacle facing independent CSOs remains the extensive use and abuse of investigative and criminal procedural powers by law enforcement agencies. Searches, seizures of property, freezing of bank accounts, surveillance, prolonged investigations, arbitrary detention, and broad investigative powers continue to be employed not only for criminal justice purposes but also as instruments of political pressure. These practices form part of a broader state policy rather than isolated instances of abuse.
This policy is closely connected with the government's declared objective of combating foreign influence. Authorities continue to target foreign funding, international partnerships, and external information flows affecting Belarusian society. Such measures are implemented through extensive use of legislation on extremism, which has become one of the principal legal instruments used against independent civil society. Organisations and individuals continue to face designation as extremist formations or affiliates of extremist activities, while publications, websites, and online content are frequently recognised as extremist materials. At the same time, Belarus increasingly relies on forms of transnational repression directed against activists abroad through criminal proceedings in absentia, international pressure, threats against family members remaining in Belarus, and other mechanisms intended to discourage cross-border civic activity.
The suspension of USAID programmes in 2025 created difficulties for some CSOs, particularly those operating outside Belarus or relying indirectly on American funding through intermediary programmes. Although many organisations were forced to reduce activities, by the end of the year most had adapted by diversifying funding sources, restructuring programmes, or reducing operational costs.
At the same time, certain amendments to the EU sanctions regime introduced exemptions intended to facilitate the activities of Belarusian civil society organisations and independent media. Belarusian CSOs both inside and outside the country continue to face serious practical obstacles in accessing banking services, transferring funds, and maintaining financial operations because of the indirect effects of sanctions compliance measures adopted by European financial institutions.
Differences between civil society operating inside Belarus and organisations established abroad continue to deepen. Exiled organisations remain closely connected with democratic political structures and focus extensively on international advocacy. Inside Belarus, however, CSOs increasingly avoid political issues, concentrating instead on local social, humanitarian and technical initiatives. Public visibility has similarly diverged: CSOs abroad actively communicate their advocacy and fundraising activities, whereas those inside Belarus deliberately minimise public exposure as a strategy for reducing risks.
Some legislative planning documents for 2026 envisage future work on laws concerning volunteer activities and foreign gratuitous aid, continuing the gradual development of domestic legislation regulating charitable and sponsorship support. However, these initiatives do not fundamentally alter the restrictive legal and political environment in which independent civil society continues to operate.
Overall, Belarusian civil society in 2025 remained characterised by a combination of reduced organisational capacity, continuing political repression, and increasing adaptation. The most intensive phase of the nationwide crackdown on CSOs appears to have passed, but selective repression, criminal prosecution, administrative restrictions, and legal uncertainty continue to define the operating environment. The state's strategy has evolved from mass elimination of organisations towards maintaining a tightly controlled civic sphere through selective enforcement, criminal investigations, restrictions on foreign influence, and sustained pressure on independent civic actors both inside Belarus and abroad.
Key priorities to improve the civil society environment:
- Release all individuals recognised as political prisoners and stop all politically-motivated criminal cases and investigations;
- Abolish the Law on the Countering of Extremism and all by-laws adopted under it, especially the Index of Extremist Formations and the Index of Extremist Materials;
- Cancel criminal responsibility for organising and participating in the activities of an unregistered organisation (Article 1931 of the Criminal Code) and abolish the ban on the activities of public associations without registration;
- Stop the practice of forced termination of CSOs and restore real opportunities to operate for CSOs previously forcibly terminated in 2020–2025 (including public associations, foundations and private institutions, trade unions and their independent associations, religious organisations and opposition political parties);
- Cease all forms of repression and discrimination against protesters, representatives of the opposition and CSOs, including mass administrative and criminal prosecution of activists inside the country and abroad in absentia, abuse of investigative powers, searches, seizures of data and communication devices, fines, arrests, the freezing of assets, and forced public disclosure in the media (including social media) of personal data during investigations or arrests;
- Eliminate legislative possibilities for and the practice of internet disruption and the blocking of websites without court decisions; and
- Cease the misuse of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) legislation and investigative powers in hate speech crimes to restrict freedom of expression and freedom of thought, as well as to restrict access to funding from abroad for charities, human rights and humanitarian CSOs.
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