Moldova is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in October 2025. In 2024, its presidential election and referendum on EU accession were marked by an unprecedented level of foreign interference.
On 17 March 2025, the Moldovan Parliament registered an amendment aimed at tackling online disinformation, in the context of electoral integrity. The amendment to the Contravention Code, which governs misdemeanours—less serious offenses that do not qualify as criminal but still carry legal penalties -is part of a broader draft law addressing electoral corruption. The legal initiative proposes fines for spreading ‘false or misleading information’ online, with particular emphasis on content that harms democratic processes, public health, or national security.
The amendment has sparked significant debate, particularly regarding its potential impact on freedom of expression. While proponents argue that the measure is necessary to protect democratic processes and public security, critics warn that it could infringe on fundamental rights, especially freedom of speech.
New draft provisions on online disinformation: Fines, aggravating factors, and exemptions
The amendment is part of a draft law on combating electoral corruption, which was debated and approved in the first reading in December 2024. Now, the authors of the amendment propose adding a new article to the Contravention Code (Article 70/4. Online Disinformation). In short, it establishes fines for spreading ‘false or misleading information online, whose false or misleading nature can be verified’. This act must be ‘committed deliberately to mislead the public and cause public harm to democratic processes, public health, or national security’.
The article also includes several aggravating circumstances that increase the severity of the offense and the penalty. These include online disinformation committed with prejudice, involving hate speech, or intended to unlawfully coerce voters into exercising or refraining from exercising certain electoral rights.
Under the proposed article, those sharing ‘false or misleading’ information for satire/humor, misleading advertising, public interest debates, expressing personal opinions, or countering disinformation would be exempt from liability. However, this exemption should be accompanied by a clear and mandatory disclaimer stating that the shared information constitutes disinformation.
What are the international precedents and concerns regarding regulating disinformation?
Similar regulations can be found in the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation. This legislation imposes fines for ‘the dissemination via mass media and ICT networks of socially significant information known to be false, under the guise of reliable reports, which created a risk of harm to life or health, property damage, incitement to mass disorder, or undermining public security (...)’. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has communicated a case to the Russian authorities that is currently pending (Avagyan v. Russia – 36911/20). In this case, a woman was fined for an Instagram comment questioning the coronavirus pandemic.
Similarly, the legal framework of Tunisia imposes fines and imprisonment for ‘the deliberate use of communication and information systems to produce, promote, disseminate, or prepare false news, statements, rumors, or forged documents attributed to others, with the aim of violating the rights of others, affecting public security or national defense, or spreading terror among the population’.
In an opinion issued by the Venice Commission regarding a provision in a draft amendment to the Turkish Penal Code — similar to the one recently proposed by Moldovan lawmakers — the Commission concluded that ‘interference with the freedom of expression which the draft provision under consideration would produce in Türkiye if enacted would neither be “necessary in a democratic society” nor proportionate to the legitimate aims of prevention of disorder and protection of national security, of health and of rights of others'. In addition, the Commission expressed particular concern with the potential consequences of such provision, namely, the chilling effect and increased self-censorship, not least in view of the upcoming elections in June 2023’, and recommended that Turkish authorities refrain from adopting the amendment.
Concerns over freedom of expression and legal ambiguities
The Independent Journalism Center (IJC) issued an opinion on the amendment, stating that ‘the interference with freedom of expression that this provision would produce, if adopted, would not be necessary in a democratic society and would not be proportionate to the legitimate objectives it aims to protect’.
IJC also recalled that similar mechanisms included in the 2022 draft law, known as the ‘Anti-Disinformation Law’, were abandoned following debates and public consultations, which concluded that such provisions had the potential to allow unjustified interference with freedom of expression and were contrary to international standards in the field.
IJC urged the authors of the initiative as well as members of Parliament, not to adopt the proposed amendment regarding the addition of Article 70/4 to the Contravention Code, arguing that it ‘is in total dissonance with the principle of clarity, accessibility, and predictability of the law’.
The IJC notes, first and foremost, that the draft provision constitutes an interference with the freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10 ECHR, and assesses it against three criteria: (i) to be prescribed by law, (ii) to pursue at least one of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 10(2) of the ECHR and (iii) to be necessary in democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
In order for Article 70/4 to meet the first Article 10 criterion of “provided for by the law”, its scope of application should be clarified through the use of clearly defined terms. Currently, the amendment contains vague terms open to interpretation.
Although the amendment's explanatory note claims that Article 70/4 focuses only on factual statements, the actual wording of the article contradicts this claim. Moldova’s current law does not define ‘false’ or ‘misleading’ information, though it distinguishes between facts, opinions, and value judgments. ‘False information’ refers to incorrect facts, while ‘misleading information’ refers to value judgments without factual support, which cannot be verified.
Article 70/4 aims to protect values like ‘democratic processes’, ‘public health’, and ‘national security’, but these abstract terms may be interpreted unpredictably and abusively in the context of Contravention Code.
The law’s vague terms could lead to unpredictable interpretations, and the media’s special protections under Article 10 of the ECHR must be considered.
These, along with numerous other uncertainties, ambiguities, and legislative inconsistencies, clearly indicate that Article 70/4 is entirely inconsistent with the principles of clarity, accessibility, and foreseeability of the law.
During the public consultations held on 21 March regarding a series of amendments, including the revision of Article 70/4, the proposed amendment on online disinformation was not discussed. At the outset, the deputies who registered the amendment, suggested transferring the initiative to the Parliamentary Committee responsible for the media sector for further debate, highlighting the need for a more in-depth review in collaboration before finalising the proposal.
The proposed amendment seeks to address the issue of online disinformation, but its vagueness, broad terminology, and potential for overreach raise significant concerns. The Independent Journalism Center's opinion highlights the risks to freedom of expression, suggesting that the amendment could violate international standards, including those set by the European Court of Human Rights. These issues, alongside concerns about the inconsistency of the law with principles of clarity and foreseeability, underscore the need for a more precise and balanced approach to regulating disinformation.